Before signing the Bill, the President has the power under Article 26 of the Constitution to refer the bill to the Supreme Court when there is doubt as to whether it is constitutional. The President must first consult with the Council of State but the decision to refer the Bill is the President's alone.
The Supreme Court must decide whether or not the Bill conflicts with the Constitution. If the Supreme Court holds that the Bill is unconstitutional, the President cannot sign it into law. Under Article 34 of the Constitution, if a Bill has been referred by the President and the Supreme Court decides that the Bill is compatible with the Constitution, the constitutionality of this legislation cannot be challenged subsequently.
The High Court has the power or jurisdiction to cancel any law or part of any law that is repugnant to the Constitution. This means that if you believe that a law breaches the Constitution or your fundamental rights, you may bring proceedings in the High Court. The constitutionality of an Act that has not yet commenced may be challenged where an order commencing it could be made at any time. Notice of the proceedings must be served on the Attorney General.
In order to challenge the constitutionality of legislation, you must show that you have "sufficient interest" in the proceedings, that is, that the legislation affects you in some real way. You must also show that you have an arguable case, that is, that your case has grounds.
But the courts have the last word on whether something is constitutional. They can only do so if someone takes the matter to them: Courts cannot start cases on their own. Indian courts have done so to enforce the human rights provisions of the Indian Constitution, but this is very unusual. Our Constitution makes it simple to bring cases before the courts. The only way to become President of the Republic of Kenya is to win an election or be Deputy President when the President dies or is removed , and to be sworn in according to the Constitution and law.
Anyone else who pretends to take the position of President could be said to be acting unconstitutionally. But in truth, they are simply doing something constitutionally meaningless. Whether their behaviour is positively illegal cannot be decided just by reading the Constitution: We need to read the Penal Code. The Constitution does not make any behaviour a crime.
A separate law does this. It might also make a person — or the state — liable to pay compensation to someone injured, particularly by a violation of the Bill of Rights. The Constitution makes it clear that awarding compensation is possible. If a court decides that something — a law, an appointment, and an action — is unconstitutional, they are — on the face of it — saying it is a legal nothing.
Sometimes that is reasonably straightforward. Eight sections of the Security Laws Amendment Act, , were declared unconstitutional early in The new rules had not been applied, so no complications were caused by ruling that they had no legal effect.
But sometimes declaring unconstitutional a law that has been used for some time might cause problems — what about things that had already been done innocently relying on that law? A fascinating Canadian example, the Supreme Court declared that all laws of the Province of Manitoba were invalid because they were only in English not also French.
The Court suspended the order for two years to allow the province to fix the problem, and avoid everything done under the authority of statutes for many years being a legal nullity. In December , the Kenyan High Court declared regulations made by the Ministry of Lands invalid for lack of consultation with the National Land Commission and lack of public participation both constitutional requirements.
A Georgia law levying inspection fees and providing for inspection of oil and gasoline was unconstitutional as applied to gasoline and oil in interstate commerce; for the fees clearly exceeded the cost of inspection and amounted to a tariff levied without the consent of Congress.
An Arkansas law exacting of persons insuring property in Arkansas a five-percent tax on amounts paid on premiums to insurers not authorized to do business in Arkansas violated due process insofar as it was applied to insurance contracted and paid for outside Arkansas by a foreign corporation doing a local business.
A Vermont levy of a property tax on logs under control of the owner which, in the course of their interstate journey, were being temporarily detained by a boom to await subsidence of high waters and for the sole purpose of saving them from loss, was void as a burden on interstate commerce.
A Pennsylvania law that forbade mining in such a way as to cause subsidence of any human habitation or public street or building and which thereby made commercially impracticable the removal of valuable coal deposits was deemed arbitrary and amounted to a deprivation of property without due process.
As applied to an owner of land who, prior to this enactment, had validly deeded the surface with express reservation of right to remove coal underneath and subject to waiver by grantee of damage claims resulting from such mining, said law also impaired the obligation of contract.
Justice dissenting: Brandeis. A South Carolina statute, as construed, that sought to convert a covenant in a prior legislative contract into a condition subsequent, and to impose as a penalty for its violation the forfeiture of valuable property, impaired the obligation of contract. A first mortgage executed to a Federal Land Bank is a federal instrumentality and cannot be subjected to an Alabama recording tax. An Ohio law that applied to interstate and intrastate commerce, and that exacted fees for inspection of petroleum products in excess of the legitimate cost of inspection, imposed an invalid import tax to the extent that the excess could not be separated and assigned solely to intrastate commerce.
Insofar as drainage district tax authorized under an Arkansas law imposed upon a railroad a levy disproportionate to the value of the benefits derived from an improvement, the tax violated the Equal Protection Clause.
A Minnesota law that provided that interstate railroads that had an agent in Minnesota to solicit traffic over lines outside Minnesota may be served with summons by delivery of copy of it to the agent imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce as applied to a carrier that owned and operated no facilities in Minnesota and that was sued by a plaintiff who did not reside in Minnesota on a cause of action arising outside the state. A Nebraska law that forbade the teaching of any language other than English in any school, private, denominational, or public, maintaining classes for the first eight grades denied liberty without due process of law.
Justices dissenting: Holmes, Sutherland. Accord: Bartels v. Iowa , U. A similar Iowa law violates due process. Same division of Justices as in Meyer v. A Georgia law that extended corporate limits of a town and that, as judicially construed, had the effect of rendering applicable to the added territory street railway rates fixed by an earlier contract between the town and the railway impaired the obligation of that contract by adding to its burden.
Accord: Dorchy v. Kansas , U. Industrial Court , U. A Wisconsin law that required a foreign corporation not doing business in Wisconsin, or having property there, other than that sought to be recovered in a suit, to send, as a condition precedent to maintaining such action, its officer with corporate records pertinent to the matter in controversy, and to submit to an adversary examination before answer, but which did not subject nonresident individuals to such examination, except when served with notice and subpoena within Wisconsin, and then only in the court where the service was had, and which limited such examinations, in the case of residents of Wisconsin, individual or corporate, to the county of their residence violated the Equal Protection Clause.
A West Virginia law that required pipe line companies to fill all local needs before endeavoring to export any natural gas extracted in West Virginia was void as a prohibited interference with interstate commerce. Washington state and county property taxes cannot be levied on the property of a corporation that, though formed under Washington law, was a federal instrumentality created and operated by the United States as an instrument of war.
A Louisiana license tax law could not validly be enforced as to the business of companies employed as agents by owners of vessels engaged exclusively in interstate and foreign commerce when the services performed by the agents consisted of the soliciting and engaging of cargo, and the nomination of vessels to carry it, etc.
See Texas Transp. New Orleans, U. A Texas law that permitted a nonresident to prosecute a case which arose outside of Texas against a railroad corporation of another state, which was engaged in interstate commerce and neither owned nor operated facilities in Texas, was inoperative because it burdened interstate commerce.
As imposed, the tax also violated the Equal Protection Clause. A Michigan law that converted an interstate contract motor carrier into a public utility by legislative fiat in effect took property for public use without compensation in violation of the due process clause, and also imposed unreasonable conditions on the right to carry on interstate commerce. A Washington law that prohibited motor vehicle common carriers for hire from using its highways without obtaining a certificate of convenience could not validly be exacted of an interstate motor carrier; the law was not a regulation designed to promote public safety but a prohibition of competition and, accordingly, burdened interstate commerce.
Accord: Bush Co. Maloy , U. Accord: Allen v. Galveston Truck Line Corp. A Massachusetts law that imposed excise tax on foreign corporations doing business in the state, measured by a combination of the total value of capital shares attributable to transactions therein and the proportion of net income attributable to such transactions, could not validly be applied to a foreign corporation which transacted only as interstate business therein.
The tax as here imposed also violated due process by affecting property beyond Massachusetts borders. Oregon Compulsory Education Law that required every parent to send his child to a public school was an unconstitutional interference with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of children and violated due process.
An Arkansas statute that imposed special assessment on lands acquired by private owners from the United States on account of benefits resulting from road improvements completed before the United States parted with title effected a taking of property without due process of law.
Justices dissenting: Holmes, Brandeis, Stone. A Pennsylvania law that prohibited the use of shoddy, even when sterilized, in the manufacture of bedding materials, was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to violate due process. A New Mexico law that forbade insurance companies authorized to do business in that state to pay any nonresident any fee for the obtaining or placing of any policies covering risks in New Mexico violated due process because it attempted to control conduct beyond the jurisdiction of New Mexico.
Justices dissenting: McReynolds, Brandeis, Sanford. An Oklahoma inheritance tax law, applied to inheritance by Indians of Indian lands as determined by federal law, was void as a tax on a federal instrumentality. Acts of New York of and authorizing New York City to erect piers over submerged lots impaired the obligation of contract as embraced in deeds to such submerged lots conveyed to private owners for valuable consideration through deeds executed by New York City in Act of New York of that authorized New York City to construct certain harbor improvements impaired the obligation of contract embraced in prior deeds to grantees whereunder the latter were accorded the privilege of filling in their underwater lots and constructing piers thereover.
A California law that provided that private carriers by automobile for hire could not operate over California highways between fixed points in the state without obtaining a certificate of convenience and submitting to regulation as common carriers exacted an unconstitutional condition and effected a denial of due process. An Oklahoma law that levied an ad valorem tax on ores mined and in bins on the land was void as a tax on federal instrumentality when applied to a lessee of Indian land leased with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.
Justices dissenting: McReynolds, Brandeis. A Minnesota law levying personal property tax could not be collected on logs cut in Minnesota pursuant to a contract of sale for delivery in Michigan while they were in transit in interstate commerce by a route from Minnesota to Michigan. A North Carolina inheritance tax law could not validly be applied to property constituting a trust fund in Massachusetts established under the will of a Massachusetts resident and bestowing a power of appointment upon a North Carolina resident who exercised that power through a will made in North Carolina; the levy by a state of the tax on property beyond its jurisdiction violated due process.
A Pennsylvania law exacting a license from persons engaged in the state in the sale of steamship tickets and orders for transportation to or from foreign countries was void as imposing an undue burden on foreign commerce. Justices dissenting: Brandeis, Holmes, Stone. Justices dissenting: Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, Sanford. An Ohio law that compensated mayors serving as judges in minor prohibition offenses solely out of the fees and costs collected from defendants who were convicted violated due process.
Texas White Primary Law that barred Negroes from participation in Democratic party primary elections denied them the equal protection of the laws. A Minnesota law that punished anyone who discriminated between different localities of that state by buying dairy products in one locality at a higher price than was paid for the same commodities in another locality infringed liberty of contract as protected by the Due Process Clause.
An Ohio law that destroyed assignability of a franchise previously granted to an electric company by a municipal ordinance impaired the obligation of contract. Justices dissenting: Holmes, Brandeis. A Kentucky law that imposed a franchise tax on railroad corporations was constitutionally defective and violated due process insofar as it was computed by including mileage outside the state that did not in any plain and intelligible way add to the value of the road and the rights exercised in Kentucky.
Special assessments levied against a railroad by a road district pursuant to an Arkansas statute and based on real property and rolling stock and other personalty were unreasonably discriminatory and excessive and deprived the railroad of property without due process because other assessments for the same improvement were based solely on real property.
As construed and applied to an organization not shown to have advocated any crime, violence, or other unlawful acts, the Kansas criminal syndicalism law violated due process.
Because of the exception it contained, under which its prohibitions were not to apply to conduct engaged in by participants whenever necessary to obtain a reasonable profit from products traded in, the Colorado Antitrust Law was void for want of a fixed standard for determining guilt and a violation of due process. As applied to a foreign corporation having a fixed place of business and an agent in one county, but no property, debts or anything also in the county in which it was sued, Arkansas law that authorized actions to be brought against a foreign corporation in any county in the state, while restricting actions against domestic corporations to the county where it had a place of business or where its chief officer resided, deprived the foreign corporation of equal protection of the laws.
A Wisconsin law levying a tax on the gross income of domestic insurance companies was void where the income was derived in part as interest on United States bonds. A New Jersey statute that provided that in suits by residents against nonresidents for injuries resulting from operation of motor vehicles by the latter, service might be made on the Secretary of State as their agent, but that failed to provide any assurance that notice of such service would be communicated to the nonresidents, violated due process.
Justices concurring: Taft, C. Accord: Consolidated Flour Mills Co. Muegge , U. Property taxes assessed under New Jersey law on land acquired from the United States Housing Corporation by private purchasers subject to retention of mortgage by the federal agency could not be collected by sale of the land unless the federal liens were excluded and preserved as prior liens.
State and city taxes authorized under laws of Virginia may not be levied on the corpus of a trust located in Maryland, the income from which accrued to a beneficiary resident in Virginia; the corpus was beyond the jurisdiction of Virginia and accordingly the assessments violated due process.
Justices dissenting: Holmes, Brandeis, Sanford, Stone. A Massachusetts income tax law could not validly be imposed on income received by a citizen as royalties for the use of patents issued by the United States. Justices dissenting: Holmes, Brandeis, Sutherland, Stone.
Accord: Graysburg Oil Co. Texas , U. A New Jersey law empowering the Secretary of Labor to fix the fees charged by employment agencies violated due process because the regulation was not imposed on a business affected with a public interest.
Justices concurring: Sutherland, Taft, C. A Pennsylvania law that taxed gross receipts of foreign and domestic corporations derived from intrastate operation of taxicabs, but exempted like receipts derived by individuals and partnerships, denied equal protection of the laws.
The Louisiana Shrimp Act, which permitted shipment of shrimp taken in Louisiana tidal waters only if the heads and hulls had previously been removed, and which was designed to favor the canning in Louisiana of shrimp destined for the interstate market, was unconstitutional; those taking the shrimp immediately became entitled to ship them in interstate commerce. Accord: Johnson v. Haydel , U. A Pennsylvania law that prohibited corporate ownership of a drug store unless all of the stockholders were licensed pharmacists had no reasonable relationship to public health and therefore violated due process.
A Tennessee law that fixed the prices at which gasoline may be sold violated due process because the business sought to be regulated was not affected with a public interest. Justice dissenting: Holmes. Where the local property of a foreign corporation and the part of its business transacted in the state, less than half of which was intrastate, were but small fractions of its entire property and its nationwide business, Washington law that taxed the corporation in the form of a filing fee and a license tax, both reckoned upon its authorized capital stock, was inoperative because it burdened interstate commerce and reached property beyond the state contrary to due process.
An Oklahoma law that permitted an individual to engage in the business of ginning cotton only upon a showing of public necessity, but allowed a corporation to engage in that business in the same locality without such a showing, denied the individual equal protection of the law. A Georgia banking law that declared that every insolvency of a bank shall be deemed to have been fraudulent, with provision for rebutting that presumption, was arbitrary and unreasonable and violated due process.
A Louisiana tax law could not be enforced against oil purchased at interior points for export in foreign commerce for the oil did not lose its character as goods in foreign commerce merely because, after shipment to the exporter at a Louisiana port, the oil was temporarily stored there preparatory to loading on vessels of foreign consignees. A Kentucky law imposing a tax on the sale of gasoline could not be applied to gasoline purchased outside Kentucky for use in a ferry engaged as an instrumentality of interstate commerce, that is, in operation on the Ohio River between Kentucky and Illinois.
A Massachusetts law imposing an excise on domestic business corporations was in reality a statute imposing a tax on income rather than a tax on the corporate privilege and, as an income tax law, could not be imposed on income derived from United States bonds nor, because it impaired the obligation of contract, on income from local county and municipal bonds exempt by statutory contract.
Justices dissenting: Stone, Holmes, Brandeis. A Virginia law that levied a property tax on corpus of a trust consisting of securities managed by a Maryland trustee who paid over to children of settlor, all of whom resided in Virginia, the income from the trust, violated due process because it taxed intangibles with a taxable situs in Maryland, where the trustee and owner of the legal title was located.
A Minnesota inheritance tax law, insofar as it was applied to Minnesota securities kept in New York by the decedent who died domiciled in New York, violated due process. Indiana was powerless to give any force or effect beyond her borders to its law that purported to authorize a county treasurer to sue for unpaid taxes owed by a nonresident; such officer derived no authority in New York from this Indiana law and hence had no legal capacity to sue in a federal court in New York.
A Missouri law that provided that, in taxing assets of insurance companies, the amounts of their legal reserves and unpaid policy claims should first be deducted, was invalid as applied to a company owning nontaxable United States bonds insofar as the law was construed to require that the deduction should be reduced by the proportion of the value that such bonds bore to total assets; the company thus was saddled with a heavier tax burden than would have been imposed had it not owned such bonds.
A Texas law that forbade insurance stipulations limiting the time for suit on a claim to less than two years could not be applied, consistently with due process, to permit recovery contrary to the terms of a fire insurance policy executed in Mexico by a Mexican insurer and covered in part by reinsurance effected in Mexico and New York by New York insurers licensed to do business in Texas who defended against a Texas claimant to whom the policy was assigned while he was a resident of Mexico and where he resided when the loss was sustained.
Arkansas personal property tax laws could not be enforced against the purchaser of army blankets situate within an army cantonment in that state, as to which exclusive federal jurisdiction attached under Art. South Carolina inheritance tax law could not be applied, consistently with due process, to affect the transfer by will of shares in a South Carolina corporation and debts owed by the latter belonging to a decedent who died domiciled in Illinois; such intangibles were not shown to have acquired any taxable business situs in South Carolina.
Justices concurring: Hughes, C. A Nebraska law, as construed, that required a railroad to provide an underground cattle-pass across its right of way partly at its own expense for the purpose, not of advancing safety, but merely for the convenience of a farmer owning land on both sides of the railroad, deprived the latter of property without due process.
An Arkansas law that withheld from a foreign corporation the right to sue in state courts unless it had filed a copy of its charter and a financial statement and had designated a local office and an agent to accept service of process could not constitutionally be enforced to prevent suit by a non-complying foreign corporation to collect a debt which arose out of an interstate transaction for the sale of goods.
A Massachusetts law that imposed succession taxes on all property in Massachusetts transferred by deed or gift intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after the death of the grantor, or transferred to any person absolutely or in trust, could not, consistently with due process or the Contract Clause, be enforced with reference to rights of succession or rights effected by gift that vested under trust agreements created prior to passage of the act, notwithstanding that the settlor died after its passage.
Justices dissenting: Roberts, Holmes, Brandeis, Stone. A Tennessee law that imposed a privilege tax graduated to carrying capacity on motor buses, the proceeds from which were not segregated for application to highway maintenance, was void insofar as the privilege tax was imposed on a bus carrier engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. Florida law that required motor carriers to furnish bond or an insurance policy for the protection of the public against injuries but which exempted vehicles used exclusively in delivering dairy products and carriers engaged exclusively in transporting fish, agricultural, and dairy products between production to shipping points en route to primary market denied the equal protection of the laws; and insofar as it subjected carriers for hire to the same requirements as to procurement of a certificate of convenience and necessity and rate regulation as were exacted of common carriers the law violated due process.
A Minnesota law that authorized the enjoinder of one engaged regularly in the business of publishing a malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspaper or magazine, as applied to publications charging neglect of duty and corruption on the part of state law enforcement officers, effected an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of the press as safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A Mississippi privilege tax could not be enforced as to an interstate pipe line company that sold gas wholesale to local, independent distributors from a supply which passed into and through the state in interstate commerce; fact that pipe line company, in order to make delivery, used a thermometer and reduced pressure, did not convert the sale into an intrastate transaction.
A Maine transfer tax law could not be applied, consistently with due process, to the inheritance of shares in a Maine corporation passing under the will of a Massachusetts testator who died a resident of Massachusetts and owning the shares. An Oklahoma law that prohibited anyone from engaging in the manufacture, sale, or distribution of ice without a state license, to be issued only on proof of public necessity and capacity to meet public demand, constituted an invalid regulation of a business not affected with a public interest and a denial of liberty to pursue a lawful calling contrary to due process.
Justices dissenting: Brandeis, Stone. Repeal of a California constitutional provision making directors of corporations liable to creditors for all moneys misappropriated or embezzled impaired the obligation of contract as to creditors who dealt with corporations during the period when the constitutional provision was in force, and inclusion in the state constitution of another provision under which the state reserved the power to alter or repeal all existing or future laws concerning corporations could not be invoked to destroy vested rights contrary to due process.
Justices dissenting: Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone. Texas White Primary Law that empowered the state executive committee of a political party to prescribe the qualifications of members of the party and thereby to exclude Negroes from voting in primaries conducted by the party amounted to state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Florida Chain Store Tax Law, which levied a heavier privilege tax per store on the owner whose stores were in different counties than on the owner whose stores were all in the same county, denied equal protection of the laws. Justices dissenting: Brandeis, Cardozo, Stone. A Wisconsin law, insofar as it authorized service of process on a foreign corporation that sold goods in Wisconsin through a controlled subsidiary and hence was not carrying on any business in the state at the time of the attempted service, violated due process, notwithstanding that the summons was served on an officer of the corporation temporarily in Wisconsin for the purpose of negotiating a controversy with a local attorney.
A section of the California Alien Land Law that provided that, when the state, in a prosecution for violating such law, proved use or occupancy by an alien lessee, alleged in the indictment to be an alien ineligible for naturalization, the onus of proving citizenship shall devolve upon the defense, was arbitrary and violated due process as applied to the lessee because a lease of land conveys no hint of criminality and there is no practical necessity for relieving the prosecution of the obligation of proving Japanese race.
A California law that levied a license tax upon every distributor for each gallon of motor vehicle fuel sold and delivered by him in the state could not constitutionally be applied to the sale and delivery of gasoline to a military reservation as to which the United States had acquired exclusive jurisdiction. Mississippi statutes, as judicially construed, that deemed all contracts of insurance and surety covering its citizens to have been made in Mississippi and that were enforced to facilitate recovery under an indemnity contract consummated in Tennessee in conformity with the law of Tennessee, where the insured, a Mississippi corporation, also conducted its business, and to nullify as contrary to Mississippi law nonobservance of a contractual stipulation as to the time for filing claims, violated due process because the Mississippi laws were accorded effect beyond the territorial limits of Mississippi.
An Alabama law, as judicially construed, that precluded Alabama courts from entertaining actions against foreign corporations arising in other states under federal law, while permitting entertainment of such actions arising in other states under state law, violated the Constitution. An Arkansas law that exempted life insurance proceeds from judicial process, when applied to prevent recovery by a creditor of the insured who had garnished the insurer prior to passage of the law, impaired the obligation of contract.
Montana laws that imposed an occupation tax on every telephone company providing service in the state imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce when applied to a company that used the same facilities to furnish both interstate as well as intrastate services.
The New York Milk Control Act, insofar as it prohibited the sale of milk imported from another state unless the price paid to the producer in the other state equaled the minimum prescribed for purchases from local producers, imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce irrespective of resale of such milk in the original or other containers.
Accord: Valentine v. Tea Co. Justices dissenting: Brandeis, Cardozo. A Kansas law that, as judicially construed, empowered the state highway commission to order a pipe line company, at its own expense, to relocate its pipe and telephone lines, then located on a private right of way, in order to conform to plans adopted for new highways across the right of way, deprived the company of property without due process of law. Justices dissenting: Cardozo.
Insofar as a Georgia statute that authorized a municipality to effect certain street improvements and to assess railways having tracks on such streets with the cost of such improvements, included an irrebuttable presumption that a benefit accrued to the railway from such improvements, the statute denied the railway a hearing essential to due process of law.
Justices dissenting: Stone, Brandeis, Cardozo. Insofar as trust certificates held by a resident represented interests in various parcels of land located in, and outside of, Ohio, and afforded the holder no voice in the management of such property but only a right to share in the net income from it and in the proceeds from the sale of it, such interests could be taxed only by a uniform rule according to value, and an Ohio law that levied an intangible property tax on such interests, which was measured by income, violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
A Louisiana law that imposed a tax on the gross receipts derived from the sale of advertisements by newspapers enjoying a circulation of more than 20, copies per week unconstitutionally restricted freedom of the press contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The New York Milk Control Act, which permitted milk dealers without well-advertised trade names who were in business before April 10, , to sell milk in New York City at a price one cent below the minimum that was binding on competitors with well-advertised trade names, denied equal protection to dealers without well-advertised names who established their business after that date. Justices concurring: Roberts, Hughes, C. A Washington statute that levied an occupation tax measured by gross receipts of radio broadcasting stations within that state whose programs were received by listeners in other states imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
An Alabama law that imposed an excise tax on the sale of gasoline could not be enforced as to sales of gasoline to the United States. A New York law that required employers to pay women minimum wages that would be not only equal to the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered but also sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living necessary for health deprived employers and employees of their freedom of contract without due process of law.
A Massachusetts succession tax law under which succession to property through failure of an intestate to exercise a power of appointment under a non-testamentary conveyance of the property by deed or trust made after September 1, , was not taxed, whereas if the conveyance were made before that date, the succession was not only taxable but the rate might be substantially increased by aggregating the value of that succession with other interests derived by the transferee by inheritance from the donee of the power, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Oregon Criminal Syndicalism Law, invoked to punish participation in the conduct of a public meeting devoted to a lawful purpose merely because the meeting had been held under the auspices of an organization that taught or advocated the forcible overthrow of government but did not engage in such advocacy during the meeting, violated freedom of assembly and freedom of speech guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A New York income tax law could not be extended to salaries of employees of the Panama Railroad Company because the company together with its employees was a federal instrumentality Art.
A Georgia insurrection statute, which punished as a crime the acts of soliciting members for a political party and conducting meetings of a local unit of that party, where one of the doctrines of the party, established by reference to a document not shown to have been exhibited by anyone, may be said to embrace ultimate resort in the indefinite future to violence against government, invaded freedom of speech as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A Washington statute that increased the severity of a penalty for a specific offense by mandating a sentence of 15 years, thereby removing the discretion of the judge to sentence for less than the maximum of 15 years, when applied retroactively to a crime committed before its enactment, was invalid as an ex post facto law. A Georgia law that prohibited stock insurance companies writing fire and casualty insurance from acting through agents who were their salaried employees, but that permitted mutual companies writing such insurance to do so, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justices dissenting: Roberts, Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo. A Washington gross receipts tax law could not validly be enforced as to receipts accruing to a stevedoring corporation acting as an independent contractor in loading and unloading cargoes of vessels engaged in interstate or foreign commerce by longshoremen subject to its own direction and control; such business was a form of interstate and foreign commerce.
A West Virginia gross receipts tax law could not validly be enforced to sustain a levy on that part of gross receipts of a federal contractor working on a federal installation in West Virginia that was derived from the fabrication of equipment at its Pennsylvania plant for which the contractor received payment prior to installation of such equipment on the West Virginia site owned by the Federal Government; for such compensable activities were completed beyond the jurisdiction of West Virginia.
A California law that levied a privilege tax on admitted foreign insurers, measured by gross premiums received, violated due process insofar as it affected premiums received in Connecticut on contracts of reinsurance consummated in the latter state and covering policies of life insurance issued by other insurers to residents of California; California was without power to tax activities conducted beyond its borders.
Justices concurring: Stone, Hughes, C. An Indiana law of that repealed tenure rights of certain teachers accorded under a Tenure Act of impaired the obligation of contract. An Indiana gross receipts tax law could not constitutionally be applied to gross receipts derived by an Indiana corporation from sales in other states of goods manufactured in Indiana; as thus applied the law burdened interstate commerce. Justices concurring: Vinson, C. Justices concurring: Warren, C.
The provisions of the California Alcoholic Beverages Control Act that imposed a fee for a license to import alcoholic beverages and controlled the importation of such beverages, could not be enforced, consistently with the Twenty-first Amendment, against a retail dealer doing business in a National Park as to which California retained no jurisdiction. A Missouri statute that accorded Negro residents financial aid to enable them to obtain instruction at outofstate universities equivalent to that afforded exclusively to white students at the University of Missouri denies such Negroes the equal protection of the laws.
The obligation of a state to give equal protection of the laws can be performed only where its laws operate; that is, within its own jurisdiction. A Washington gross receipts tax levied on the privilege of engaging in business in the state cannot constitutionally be imposed on the gross receipts of a marketing agent for a federation of fruit growers whose business consists of the marketing of fruit shipped from Washington to places of sale in other states and foreign countries.
Such a tax burdens interstate and foreign commerce contrary to Art. A Florida statute imposing an inspection fee of 15 cents per cwt. An Oklahoma statute that provided that all persons, other than those who voted in , who were qualified to vote in but failed to register between April 30 and May 11, , should be perpetually disenfranchised, was found to violate the Fifteenth Amendment.
An Alabama statute that forbids the publicizing of facts concerning a labor dispute, whether by printed sign, pamphlet, word of mouth, or otherwise, in the vicinity of the business involved, and without regard to the number of persons engaged in such activity, the peaceful character of their conduct, the nature of the dispute, or the accuracy or restraint of the language used in imparting information, violates freedom of speech and press as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A Connecticut statute that forbids any person to solicit money or valuables for any alleged religious cause, unless he has first procured a license from an official who is required to determine whether the cause is a religious one and who may deny issuance if he determines that the cause is not, imposes a prior restraint of the free exercise of religion in violation of due process. Gasoline carried by interstate motor busses through Arkansas for use as fuel in interstate transportation beyond the Arkansas line cannot be subject to an Arkansas tax imposed for maintenance of state highways and collected on every gallon of gasoline above 20 brought into the state in any motor vehicle for use in operating the same.
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